Tag Archives: Tarrant County

2011 – Death and Taxes … and Chickens

The sole issue in this case was at what point in the life of a chicken does the chicken lose its tax-exempt status as poultry?

When this lawsuit was filed in 2011, Pilgrim’s Pride was the second-largest chicken producer in the world.  A vertically-integrated company, Pilgrim’s Pride controlled every phase of the production of its poultry – from egg, to hatchling, to chicken, to drumstick, to chicken salad. As such, Pilgrim’s Pride owned and operated feed mills, hatcheries, processing plants and distribution centers in 14 U.S. states, Puerto Rico and Mexico.

Following the denial of a tax protest regarding the valuation of the contents of a cold storage warehouse located in Tarrant County, Texas, Pilgrim’s Pride filed suit in the 352nd District Court seeking a de novo review[1].  Housed inside the warehouse in question was boxed, frozen chicken meat (also described as “chicken flesh,” “dead chicken, without giblets” and “breaded, baked, par-fried chicken”) on which the Tarrant Appraisal District had levied an ad valorem tax.

Texas Tax Code Section 11.16, the enabling legislation for Article VIII, Section 16 of the Texas Constitution, exempts from ad valorem taxation “farm products, livestock and poultry” held by “producers” while the producer is “financially providing for the physical requirements of such livestock and poultry.”  Pilgrim’s Pride relied on these provisions to claim tax exempt status for the contents of the warehouse.

In summary judgment motions presented to Judge Bonnie Sudderth in which both sides agreed that there was no material fact in dispute, the parties – Pilgrim’s Pride and the Tarrant County Appraisal District - submitted the case for a legal determination by Judge Sudderth.  Pilgrim’s Pride argued that the contents of its cold storage facility warehouse constituted tax-exempt “poultry” the physical requirements of which Pilgrim’s Pride, the producer, was financially providing for. As the owner and producer of the poultry, Pilgrim’s Pride contended that it was financially responsible for all of their poultry’s physical requirements from egg to chicken part storage, and all points in between, until the chicken was sold to a third party.  For that reason, Pilgrim’s Pride sought a summary judgment ruling that its warehoused chicken would retain its tax-exempt status until it was sold in the market.

Tarrant Appraisal District filed a summary judgment motion as well, taking the position that once the chickens were no longer alive, Pilgrim’s Pride became a “processor” rather than a “producer” within the meaning of the Constitution and Statute.  The District also argued that frozen chickens would no longer have “physical requirements” requiring financial support, which the statute requires in order to support a tax exemption.  The Tarrant Appraisal District sought a summary judgment ruling by Judge Bonnie Sudderth that the chicken stored in Pilgrim’s Pride warehouse were properly subject to ad valorem taxation under state law.

Judge Bonnie Sudderth ruled that just as livestock, once slaughtered, would no longer enjoy tax exempt status as “livestock” under the constitutional and statutory provisions, poultry, once slaughtered, would not longer enjoy tax exempt status as “poultry” under these same provisions.

In explaining her ruling, Judge Sudderth pointed to the idiosyncrasy of the English language that changes the name of some farm animals once they are slaughtered.  In polite company, one would not purchase steaks or pork chops by asking the butcher for a pound of “livestock” or “pig,” whereas, “poultry” and “chicken” are permissible nouns to to describe chicken, whether located in the coop or behind the meat counter.  The statute clearly identifies “livestock” as tax exempt, but not “beef” or “pork,” so there is no confusion in the law with regard to bovines or swine.  Once the cow and the pig are slaughtered, their tax exempt status ends. Judge Sudderth reasoned that even though the English language calls for no name change upon the death of a chicken, it would make no sense for there to be a distinction between dead cows, pigs or poultry when it comes to ad valorem taxation.

Furthermore, Judge Sudderth reasoned, the purpose of the tax-exemption laws would not extend to cold-storage warehousing of meat products.  These laws were designed to provide tax exemptions to farmers and ranchers who were tending to the daily needs (such as food, water and veterinary care) of their flocks and herds, not for warehousemen who simply store the frozen meats.

Finally Judge Sudderth agreed with the Tarrant Appraisal District in her opinion that neither the livestock nor the chickens, once slaughtered, would have “physical requirements” necessitating financial support, as required under the tax exemption statute.

In denying Pilgrim’s Pride’s summary judgment motion, Judge Bonnie Sudderth held that Pilgrim’s Pride, who bore the legal burden of clearly establishing that its operations fell within the tax exemption, failed to meet its burden.  In granting Tarrant Appraisal District’s motion for summary judgment, Judge Sudderth upheld the Tarrant Appraisal District’s interpretation of the constitutional and statutory provisions as reasonable and not in conflict with the plain meaning of the statute.

Judge Bonnie Sudderth’s ruling was not appealed, leaving undisturbed those two certainties in life – even in the life of a chicken - Death and Taxes.


[1] For a discussion and explanation of the concept of de novo review, go to: http://bonniesudderth.wordpress.com/2011/08/28/when-can-i-get-a-trial-de-novo/

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1998 – The God Pod

Two former Tarrant County jail inmates and a college professor filed suit in the 352nd District Court against Tarrant County and the Tarrant County Sheriff for operating a particular jail “pod” designated as the CEU (Chaplain’s Education Unit).  The CEU was established in 1992 for inmates who voluntarily participated in a Christian education and ministry program while incarcerated. 

The plaintiffs argued that the creation of this “God Pod” violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.  Tarrant County argued that because no additional taxpayer money, over and above what it ordinarily cost to house jail inmates, was expended by the taxpayers to run the program, and all ministry activities were performed by volunteers, not county employees, providing this opportunity for inmates was constitutionally permissible under the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  The county also pointed out that the participants in the CEU program received no tangible benefits by virtue of participating in the program.  In fact, all CEU participants were required to give up some of the privileges that they were otherwise entitled to, such as television time, in order to be included in the program. Finally, the county pointed to the fact that participation in the pod was completely voluntary – no inmates were required to participate – in order to support its contention that the CEU unit was constitutionally permissible.  

On motions for summary judgment in which both sides agreed that there were no material facts in dispute in the case, the question of the constitutionality of the CEU was submitted to Judge Bonnie Sudderth for determination.  Judge Sudderth ruled that since no taxpayer money or resources were used to operate the program, since enrollment in the program was completely voluntary, and since the “God Pod” inmates actually forfeited, rather than received, tangible benefits in order to participate, that the jail’s “God Pod” did not constitute government establishment of a religion in violation of the First Amendment.

Two years later, the Texas Supreme Court overruled Judge Bonnie Sudderth’s decision, holding that since the CEU endorsed one particular religious view to the exclusion of others, Tarrant County conveyed the impermissible message of official preference for one specific religion. In so ruling, the Supreme Court held that the voluntary nature of the program was irrelevant.  The fact that inmates were willing to submit to the instruction, the Supreme Court reasoned, did not diminish the fact that one religious belief was promoted over other religious teachings within the pod.  This “official endorsement of the substance of the religious instruction offered in the CEU,” the Court wrote, went “beyond what the First Amendment can tolerate.”  Tarrant County’s message of preferring one specific religion over another, the Supreme Court held, violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Shortly after the ruling, the “God Pod” was dismantled.

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2001 – Taxpayer Protest of Arlington Street Maintenance Fee

In 2000, the City Council of the City of Arlington, Texas adopted an ordinance that established a street maintenance fee which was assessed in city water bills.  This fee was later amended and then finally repealed in 2003. 

During that time, on May 15, 2001, an Arlington taxpayer filed a lawsuit in the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, Texas against the City of Arlington, arguing that the fee constituted an illegal tax. Other Constitutional challenges were also raised, including allegations that the street maintenance fee violated equal protection and due process rights, was void for vagueness, and provided no mechanism for redress of unlawful collection of the tax. In addition, the taxpayer asserted that the City had violated the Texas Debt Collection Act, and he brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The City of Arlington claimed general authority to assess fees of this nature by ordinance, rather than charter amendment, but the taxpayer argued that it was a tax which was not permitted under the city charter without approval of the voters. Judge Bonnie Sudderth ultimately issued a summary judgment ruling that the City of Arlington exceeded its authority by taxing the citizens without their consent in violation of the city charter.

While the case was pending, the taxpayer also sought an injunction to prohibit the City from collecting the street maintenance fee and to require the City to refund the full amount of street maintenance fees collected. The lawsuit was brought by the taxpayer on his own behalf as an individual and resident of Arlingtonas well as on behalf of the proposed class of persons – all taxpayers from the City ofArlington- who had been billed for the street maintenance fee.

In response, the City asserted a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction due to the plaintiff’s lack of standing to sue because his claim did not meet the $500 amount-in-controversy requirement. The City also claimed immunity from suit.  Judge Bonnie Sudderth denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and granted a motion for partial summary judgment declaring the maintenance fee an unlawful tax imposed without consent required of the citizens, but denied the injunctive relief sought.

After so ruling, Judge Sudderth expressed concern to the parties that due to the unique nature of the case and the fact that because there was little guidance in the law on the correct application of the law to the facts of the case, the parties could potentially expend considerable costs of litigation which might be unnecessary if the appellate court disagreed with her interim rulings.  Because of this, Judge Sudderth suggested that the parties agree to request a written order for interlocutory appeal to the Second Court of Appeals.

This agreed interlocutory appeal mechanism was a new creature of statute (Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code, Section 51.014[d]), having at that time recently been enacted by the Texas Legislature.  The new law provided that parties in litigation may agree to appeal an otherwise non-appealable interlocutory ruling if: (1) the ruling involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, (2)  an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation;  and (3)  the parties agree to the order.

Without such agreement, the interlocutory summary judgment ruling would not have been appealable at that time, and the parties would have been required to wait until the entire case, including the class action certification issues, were concluded before testing Judge Sudderth’s ruling on appeal.  The parties agreed to go forward with an immediate agreed appeal, as suggested by Judge Sudderth, which the Second Court of Appeals accepted.  (This was the first agreed appeal that the Second Court of Appeals ever accepted under the new law.)

As a result of that agreed interlocutory appeal, Judge Sudderth’s ruling was reversed – not because her ruling was erroneous regarding the illegality of the tax – but on the ground that the taxpayer lacked “standing” to complain about it because the taxpayer failed to show a “particularized injury distinct from that suffered by the general public.” 

In the interim, the City of  Arlington held an election on the issue and the tax was ultimately approved by the voters.

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2011 – Superbowl XLV

Ten days before the Green Bay Packers and the Pittsburg Steelers went head-to-head in the most-watched epic sports event of the year – Super Bowl XLV – the two teams joined forces as co-plaintiffs  in a lawsuit filed in the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, Texas.  What could have caused these rivals who were on the verge of battle for nothing less than the World Championship title to unite together less than two weeks before the contest began?

The Green Bay and Pittsburg teams, as well as the NFL, which was also a named plaintiff, filed suit to protect their trademarks from illegal counterfeitors who would be arriving in town within a few days to capitalize on the big event.   The defendants, unnamed “Does 1 through 100,” were described as large-scale professional producers of counterfeit merchandise and the mobile middlemen and street vendors who sell their counterfeit products.  According to the plaintiffs’ pleadings, each year dealers in counterfeit merchandise “descend on the city hosting the Super Bowl game” a few days before game-day, sell their counterfeit products on a cash-only basis and then “disappear without detection.”  These counterfeiters often use fictitious names, addresses and sham business in order to perpetuate their fraud.

Superbowl XLV was hosted by the City of Arlington in Cowboy Stadium on February 6, 2011.  To combat the anticipated illegal activity, on January 26, 2011 (as had been done each year for the preceding 23 years), the teams sought and obtained seizure orders from Judge Bonnie Suderth, who empowered NFL security representatives to search for, seize and impound any counterfeit merchandise that they found or discovered on the streets during the week prior to the Super Bowl game.  Judge Sudderth’s order provided that any seized merchandise would be secured to be used as evidence at trial and thereafter disposed of by destroying the merchandise or donating it to a charity.  Only with these powers conferred upon their representatives could the NFL and the teams prevent the merchandise from being sold, Judge Sudderth ruled.

In conjuction with the seizure order, the NFL and teams also sought and received a temporary restraining order enjoining the counterfeit merchandisers from using or selling any products with their trademarks or logos, or any imitations which were confusingly similar to their protected marks or logos.  By terms of the order, violations would be punishable by contempt, which could include fines, imprisonment, or both.

While the primary thrust of the lawsuit was to obtain the power necessary to combat the counterfeit activity in advance of its occurrance, the NFL and teams also sought damages against the unnamed defendants for statutory trademark infringement, common law trademark infringement, statutory trademark dilution, unfair competition, misappropriation and conversion of merchandise, and unjust enrichment.

In the days leading up to the event, several vendors were served with the lawsuit and their merchandize seized at the point of sale which accomplished the primary purpose of the lawsuit.  The lawsuit was not so much about recovering damages after the fact, but to prevent the damage from occurring in the first place.  Consequently, several months after the dust settled, after the Packers had emerged victorious and received the attendant spoils of trophies, rings and tickertape parades, the parties settled their differences and the case was dismissed.

Now that the regular season’s about to begin, and if the odds-makers are to be believed, sometime in January, 2012, if you look closely, you just might catch a glimpse of the Packers and the Patriots quietly walking hand-in-hand up the steps into a courthouse somewhere in Indianapolis…  As for me, I’ll root for the home team.  Go Cowboys!  — Bonnie Sudderth, Judge of the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, Texas.

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1997 – Wrongful Death Involving Cell Phone Distraction

This case was a fairly high profile one because it was one of the earliest cases which highlighted the dangers of cell phone useage while driving.  Added to what would become a recipe for disaster was the fact that the driver who caused the collision was a teenager. 

In January, 1996, a 16 year-old girl whose parents were on a ski trip in Colorado, decided to take her parent’s company van out for a drive, even though she had been forbidden to do so.  She brought a cell phone along with her, and during the excursion, it fell onto the floorboard of the van.  Along the way, the cell phone rang, which distracted the teenager from her driving duties while she reached for the ringing cell phone.

During the few seconds that her eyes were taken off the roadway to retrieve the cell phone, the van veered across the center line of the highway, striking head-on a small compact car which was traveling in the opposite direction.  In the other car was a family of four – father and mother in the front seat, young daughter and son in the back.  The impact resulted in the death of the 3 year-old boy and serious brain damage to the father, resulting in his total and permanent disability.  The mother and daughter were also injured, but survived without permanent physical injuries.

A wrongful death lawsuit was filed was almost immediately in the 352nd District Court, seeking damages against both the teenager individually and against the teen’s parents.  Besides allegations of common law negligence, the plaintiffs sued under multiple other theories, including negligent entrustment, negligence per se and a claim that the vehicle itself constituted an attractive nuisance for a teenager whose parents were out of town.  With regard to their negligence action, plaintiffs complained that the teen’s parents had failed to properly instruct her on how to safely operate a mobile phone while simultaneously driving a vehicle.

During the pretrial of the case, the plaintiffs asked Judge Sudderth to recognize a new cause of action in the law – a cause of action for negligent entrustment of a cell phone.  Plaintiffs argued that the law recognizes a cause of action for negligent entrustment of chattel (tangible personal property – the cell phone itself).  Plaintiffs argued that such a cause of action exists in the common law if the person supplying the chattel has reason to know it is likely to be used in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of harm.  Plaintiffs argued that the entrustment of a cell phone to a teenager driver under these circumstances was similar to the entrustment of a firearm to a minor child, which had already been recognized in Texas jurisprudence as a basis for liability under the theory of negligent entrustment of chattel.  Judge Sudderth rejected this argument, declining to recognize a new cause of action in Texas law for negligent entrustment of a cell phone.

The plaintiffs also sought damages under the theory of negligence per se, since the teenager was also operating the vehicle with an expired driver’s license at the time of the collision.  Judge Sudderth also declined to apply the law of negligence per se in this case, rejecting plaintiff’s contention that an expired driver’s license was tantamount to driving without a license.  In her ruling, Judge Sudderth drew a distinction between driving under an expired license and driving without ever having been licensed at all.  Causing a collision or reckless driving, Judge Sudderth ruled, would be a direct result of being an unlicensed driver; hence, the law of negligence per se would apply.  However, Judge Sudderth held the mere fact that a valid license had been permitted to expire would have no direct causative relationship with the quality of a driver’s skills or abilities behind the wheel.  Therefore, Judge Sudderth ruled that under the facts of this case driving under an expired license, while a violation of the law, would not invoke the doctrine of negligence per se.

The case went to the jury on the theory of negligence as to the teenager and negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle as to the teen’s parents.  In a 10-2 verdict, the jury imposed liability on the driver, but not her parents.  Damages were awarded against the teenager in the amount of $6.9 million.  Neither the verdict, nor Judge Sudderth’s pretrial legal rulings, were appealed.

The tragic and fatal accident that gave rise to this lawsuit took place in January 1996.  Judge Bonnie Sudderth heard many news accounts of this accident while she was campaiging for the position of judge of the 352nd District Court.  She won that election two months later and by the time she took office, the lawsuit had already been filed and randomly assigned to the 352nd District Court.  The case went to trial one year later and was the first trial that garnered media attention during Judge Sudderth’s tenure on the district court bench.  It was notable because access to cell phones, cell phone technology and research regarding cell phone useage while driving was still in its infancy during this era.

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2009 – Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and the Acai Berry Claims

In response to more than 350 complaints lodged by Texas consumers, the Consumer Protection Division of  Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott’s office sought relief from Judge Bonnie Sudderth of the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, to enjoin Texas DTPA violations by a dietary supplement distributor regarding the sale of an acai berry supplement called Acai Berry Maxx.  The Attorney General sought a permanent injunction against what his office described as ongoing deceptive trade practices and requested up to $250,000 in civil penalties to be assessed against the vendor for each separate violation.

The lawsuit primarily focused on a website advertisement which offered a “free trial” sample of the product, which the Attorney General contended was not, in fact, free.  In addition, the Attorney General argued that the advertisement itself was deceptive.  In large print, Acai Berry Maxx was advertised as the “#1 Recommended Super Food” which would “reduce the risk of heart disease, Alzheimer’s disease, cancer and premature aging.”  Yet, the advertisement also contained language in fine print stating that the product was “not intended to diagnose, treat, cure or prevent any disease.”

As a part of the sales pitch, online consumers were given four minutes, during which time they were told they could take advantage of a “no obligation,” “free trial offer,” but after which time the offer would expire.  During those four minutes, customers were required to provide a credit card number and agree to three single-spaced pages of various “terms and conditions” in order to receive the “free trial offer.”  The consumer’s credit cards were immediately billed $5.95 for shipping and handling fees, and by agreeing to the terms and conditions, the consumer enrolled in a “continuity plan” which included monthly shipments of the acai berry product for a total of $85.90 per month.  (These monthly purchases would be automatically billed to the consumer’s credit card unless the subscription was cancelled within 14 days of the initial order.)

Numerous consumer complaints were filed with the Attorney General’s Office and the Better Business Bureau as a result of the advertisements and the offer, including allegations that consumers didn’t receive the actual trial sample until after the time had passed to cancel the monthly subscription.  Other consumers reported that when they attempted to cancel the subscription, their calls to the telephone numbers provided were not answered and their emails to the web addresses provided were not responded to.

Almost immediately upon the filing of the lawsuit, the parties announced to Judge Sudderth that they had agreed to settle the case.  The settlement provided that the distributor would stop selling the acai berry product in the State of Texas and would not sell it at any time in the future.  In addition, the vendor also agreed to refund all money requested by former customers and to maintain a customer service website to process and fulfill consumer refund requests for a period of at least six months after the order had been signed.

Judge Sudderth quickly signed an order setting forth the terms of the agreement and permanently enjoining the vendor from making any further false or misleading claims.  Specifically, the order required the vendor to cease claiming that the acai berry product would diagnose, cure, mitigate or prevent diseases and to remove from its website purported success stories about celebrities Brad Pitt and Rachel Ray’s alleged use of the product.  Finally, the distributor was ordered by Judge Sudderth to pay $200,000 to the Texas Attorney General’s Office as a civil penalty for the deceptive trade practices. 

(The Attorney General agreed not to attempt to collect the fine as long as the vendor complied with all other terms of the order, including the permanent injunction against selling acai berry products in the future.)

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1998 – HMO Class Action Lawsuit

Four hundred Tarrant County doctors filed a class action lawsuit against Harris HMO, alleging that the physician payment system in its plan violated Texas insurance laws.  In the lawsuit, which was filed in the 352nd District Court, the physicians asked Judge Bonnie Sudderth to issue a temporary injunction preventing the HMO from enforcing monetary penalties against doctors who overspent their budget in issuing prescriptions to patients. 

The law in Texas at the time the case was filed provided that managed care entities could not establish physician payment systems which created financial incentives to limit medically necessary care to patients.

At the temporary injunction hearing, the undisputed evidence established that physicians who spent less than budgeted amounts received bonuses from the HMO, while doctors who exceeded their budgets were penalized.  At that point in time, the HMO had imposed millions of dollars in fines against the physicians who had exceeded established budgets.  The doctors argued that they shouldn’t be forced to choose between their bottom lines and their patients’  best interests. 

In issuing the requested injunction, Judge Sudderth found that the HMO’s practices resulted in the denial of medically necessary care to patients.  “These denials include circumstances of cherry-picking, patient-dumping … and outright denials of treatment, referrals and prescriptions,” Judge Sudderth explained, in ruling in favor of the requested injunction. 

A few months later, the Texas Insurance Department levied an $800,000 fine against the HMO for violations of state insurance regulations that prohibit health plans from using financial incentives to encourage doctors to withhold medically necessary care.  Shortly thereafter, the HMO announced its plan to do away with the caps on prescription spending in physician contracts and to compensate the doctors who had been fined for exceeding their budgets.  Within a few days of this announcement, the parties entered into settlement negotiations which resulted in the eventual settlement of the lawsuit.

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Cases from the 352nd District Court

Welcome to the 352nd District Court.  The purpose of this website is to provide a history of the more interesting or notable cases from the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, Texas.

A Brief History of the 352nd District Court:

The 352nd District Court is a district court which serves all citizens of Tarrant County, Texas. Since the 352nd District Court was established on September 1, 1984, only three judges have served in its history.

John G. Street, a Tarrant County civil trial lawyer, was elected to the 352nd District Court on November 16, 1984.  Judge Street was a Democrat who served in that position until December 31, 1988, having being defeated for re-election in the 1988 election by Republican Bruce Auld, a Tarrant County civil trial attorney.  On January 1, 1989, Judge Bruce Auld took the bench, where he served until December of 1995.  Judge Auld resigned due to illness and died a short time thereafter.  Judge Bonnie Sudderth, the former Chief Judge of the Fort Worth Muncipal Court, ran in a contested Republican primary for election to the 352nd District Court bench, winning the seat for a term that would commence on January 1, 1997.  However, because the bench was vacant at the time of her primary election, then-Governor George W. Bush appointed her to fill the vacancy for the remainder of 1996.  (She had no opponent in the general election of November, 1996.)  Judge Sudderth has been re-elected three times to the 352nd District Court and is now serving her fourth term in office.  As such, Judge Sudderth is the longest-serving judge of the 352nd District Court.

Although the 352nd District Court has general jurisdiction to hear all matters properly filed in a district-level court – civil, criminal, family and juvenile cases – in practice, the court hears only civil cases. When the Texas Legislature created the 352nd District Court, it directed that this court would give preference to civil cases; therefore, pursuant to Section 24.498 of the Texas Government Code, all cases which are currently assigned to the 352nd District Court involve civil disputes.

The 352nd District Court is a trial court. Traditional notions of a “trial” usually center around the concept of a jury of 12 citizens serving as the ultimate arbiter of the case. However, most cases in the 352nd District Court are either “tried to the bench” (meaning that all matters of law and fact are presented to the judge for determination) or adjudicated by the judge as a result of a pre-trial motion. Jury trials in civil district court cases are rare today, the vast majority of cases being resolved in some manner other than a full jury trial on the merits.

Civil cases are varied and often complex, involving multiple parties and multiple legal issues in dispute. Among the many different types of cases which are filed in the 352nd District Court are cases involving:

Business entities
Class actions
Commercial litigation
Contracts
Debt collection
Employment and discrimination
Foreclosures
Insurance
Intellectual property
Medical and other professional malpractice
Oil and gas
Partnership dissolutions
Personal injury
Premises security
Property taxes
Real estate ownership and title
Worker’s compensation appeals
Wrongful death and survivorship

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